The Syrian Economy: From Rentierism to Production — A Roadmap for Economic Recovery
Faculty of Administrative and Financial Sciences-Al-Wataniya Private University
At a pivotal moment in Syria’s history, the need for a deep structural transformation of the national economy can no longer be ignored. The rentier model, dominant for decades, has proven incapable of delivering justice or efficiency. It is time to transition toward a competitive, productive economy that rebuilds trust and unleashes Syrians’ potential for sustainable development.
Dismantling the Rentier Model: A Closed Economy and Paralyzed Industries
For decades, Syria’s economic structure relied on sole proprietorships focused on quick profits, neglecting modern management and production methods. This pattern was not accidental—it stemmed directly from a closed economic system imposed by the Assad regime, where competition was absent, transparency declined, and most Syrian industries became mere packaging sectors for imported raw materials.
With no production incentives and markets monopolized by interest networks, Syria’s economy lost its ability to generate added value. The contribution of industry and agriculture to GDP declined in favor of unsustainable rent-based activities.
Table 1: Indicators of Rentierism in Syria
Sector | Indicator | Estimated Ratio / Current Status |
Industrial Enterprises | Over 60% rely on imported raw materials | Especially food and pharmaceutical industries |
Agricultural Enterprises | Partially dependent on imported inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) | Varies by crop and region |
Imported Seeds | 40–60% of total seeds used in commercial farming | Especially vegetables and improved seeds |
Imported Fertilizers | Over 70% of fertilizers are imported | Government unable to meet demand |
Urea Fertilizer | Annual need: 300,000 tons; local supply: <30,000 tons | Remainder imported or bought on black market |
Phosphate Fertilizer | Annual need: 200,000 tons; local supply: ~25,000 tons | Imported directly or via government tenders |
Analytical Note: Heavy reliance on imports in agriculture and industry exposes Syria to global price volatility and supply chain disruptions. The agricultural sector, in particular, suffers from weak domestic input production, raising costs and reducing farmers’ profit margins.
Table 2: Sectoral Impact on Macroeconomic Indicators
Indicator | Value / Ratio |
Industry & Agriculture Share of GDP | <25% in 2020 |
National Savings Rate | Dropped from 18% (2005) to 5% (2020) |
Unemployment in Some Regions | Exceeded 50% |
Sole Proprietorships | >80% of registered companies |
Interpretation: These indicators reveal deep structural imbalances. The weak contribution of productive sectors reflects a shift toward an unsustainable rentier economy. The sharp decline in savings undermines investment and resilience. High unemployment signals worsening poverty and marginalization. The dominance of sole proprietorships highlights institutional fragility and poor governance, limiting growth potential.
Principles for Transitioning to a Competitive Productive Economy
Following political transition, Syria faces a historic opportunity to rebuild its economy on modern, sustainable foundations. This requires liberalizing markets, reforming the investment climate, and enhancing transparency to attract both domestic and foreign investors.
Table 3: Investment Volume by Sector (2010–2024, in USD Millions)
Year | Agriculture | Industry | Tourism | Transport | Energy | ICT | Total |
2010 | 240 | 500 | 360 | 300 | 400 | 200 | 2,000 |
2024* | 5 | 10 | 4 | 6 | 13 | 5 | 43 |
Insight: Investment collapsed by over 97% between 2010 and 2024, reflecting war, sanctions, and deteriorating investor confidence. Agriculture fell from $240M to $5M, industry from $500M to $10M, and tourism from $360M to $4M. Even strategic sectors like transport and energy saw dramatic declines.
Required Investment to Restore GDP and Economic Activity
Using sector-specific multipliers to estimate recovery costs:
Sector | 2010 Output | 2024 Output | Gap | Multiplier | Required Investment (USD M) |
Agriculture | 240 | 5 | 235 | ×3.0 | 705 |
Industry | 500 | 10 | 490 | ×4.0 | 1,960 |
Tourism | 360 | 4 | 356 | ×3.0 | 1,068 |
Transport | 300 | 6 | 294 | ×4.0 | 1,176 |
Energy | 400 | 13 | 387 | ×4.0 | 1,548 |
ICT | 200 | 5 | 195 | ×2.5 | 487.5 |
Total Required Investment: $6.94 billion over 5–7 years, tied to institutional reform, governance, and international partnerships.
Role of Joint-Stock Companies
To mobilize savings and channel them into productive investments, Syria must promote joint-stock companies. These entities foster modern corporate culture, transparency, and accountability.
Type | Minimum Capital | Required Shareholders |
Public JSC | 1 billion SYP (~$100K) | ≥10 |
Private JSC | 100 million SYP (~$10K) | ≥3 |
Despite low entry barriers, only ~25 companies are listed on the Damascus Stock Exchange, indicating weak institutional incentives and limited access to capital markets.
Sectoral Financing Architecture via Joint-Stock Companies
Sector | Required Investment | Ideal Company Type | Capital per Company | Estimated Number of Companies |
Agriculture | 705M | Private JSC | $10M | 70 |
Industry | 1,960M | Public JSC | $100M | 20 |
Tourism | 1,068M | Mixed | $10–100M | 10 public + 6 private |
Transport | 1,176M | Public JSC | $100M | 12 |
Energy | 1,548M | Public JSC | $100M | 15 |
ICT | 487.5M | Private JSC | $10M | 48 |
Total Estimated Companies: 181 This structure diversifies funding sources, encourages innovation, and spreads risk across investors, institutions, and diaspora.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Syria
Despite an 80% drop in FDI since 2011, 12 new projects totaling $14B signal renewed interest.
Project | Value (Billion USD) |
Damascus Intl. Airport | 4 |
Damascus Metro | 2 |
Damascus Towers | 2 |
Baramkeh Mall & Towers | 0.56 |
Other Projects (10 Provinces) | 5.44 |
Note: Most projects are construction-focused and concentrated in Damascus, Aleppo, and Rural Damascus (65.5%), risking regional inequality. To maximize impact, FDI must target productive sectors and be geographically balanced.
Conclusion: From Rent to Innovation — Syria 2035
The shift from a fragile rentier economy to a competitive production-based model hinges on joint-stock companies, institutional reform, and strategic partnerships. This is not merely administrative—it’s a national project rooted in bold political will and inclusive development.
Key steps include:
Syria must now write a new economic chapter—one of production, efficiency, and sustainable justice
It was established in 2007 and includes six colleges: